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abstract
Low incomes, limited financial literacy, fraud, and deception 
are just a few of the many intractable economic and social 
factors that contribute to the financial difficulties that 
households face today. Addressing these issues directly 
is difficult and costly. But poor financial outcomes also 
result from systematic psychological tendencies, including 
imperfect optimization, biased judgments and preferences, 
and susceptibility to influence by the actions and opinions 
of others. Some of these psychological tendencies and 
the problems they cause may be countered by policies 
and interventions that are both low cost and scalable. We 
detail the ways that these behavioral factors contribute 
to consumers’ financial mistakes and suggest a set of 
interventions that the federal government, in its dual roles 
as regulator and employer, could feasibly test or implement 
to improve household financial outcomes in a variety of 
domains: retirement, short-term savings, debt management, 
the take-up of government benefits, and tax optimization.
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A
t the end of the first quarter of 2016, U.S. 
households held $102.6 trillion in assets: 
$71.1 trillion in financial assets and $31.5 
trillion in tangible assets, mostly real estate. 
Offsetting these were $14.5 trillion in household 
liabilities, mostly home mortgages ($9.5 trillion) 
and credit card debt and other loans ($3.5 tril-
lion).1 These statistics are the aggregations of the 
myriad decisions that individuals and households 
make almost every day: how much to spend 
versus save, whether to pay with cash or credit, 
how to invest, whether to rent or own a home, 
what type of mortgage to choose, how much 
and what types of insurance to get, whether to 
attend college and how to finance it, whether 
to pay bills in full and on time, whether to claim 
social welfare benefits, how much to work and 
earn, and so on.
These decisions are made amid an array of regu-
lations meant to shepherd the U.S. economy 
fairly and efficiently. The alphabet soup of federal 
organizations that oversee these economic 
activities includes the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Federal Reserve 
Board (FRB), the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (OCC), the National Credit Union 
Administration (NCUA), the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the 
Department of Labor (DOL), the Department 
of Education (DOE), the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS), the Social Security 
Administration (SSA), and the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS). With a workforce of over 4 million 
people,2 the federal government also plays an 
important role as an employer.
Against this backdrop, a growing body of 
evidence documents widespread and avoid-
able errors made by consumers in a variety 
of domains, some with significant financial 
consequences.3–15 In this article, we focus on 
behaviorally informed policies that the federal 
government could introduce and test in the 
coming years to improve consumer finan-
cial outcomes across five fraught domains: 
retirement, short-term savings, consumer 
debt, take-up of government benefits, and tax 
optimization.
Behavioral Factors That 
Contribute to Financial Mistakes
Many intractable economic and social factors—
from low incomes and limited financial literacy 
to fraud and deception—contribute to the diffi-
cult financial circumstances many households 
face. But poor financial outcomes also result 
from an array of psychological tendencies that 
may be countered by policies and interventions 
that are both low cost and scalable. We highlight 
here three tendencies that commonly compro-
mise consumer financial welfare.
Imperfect Optimization
Consumers are not always the fully rational 
agents depicted in classical economic models. 
It can be difficult, if not impossible, to correctly 
calculate the trade-offs between the different 
alternatives that characterize many financial 
decisions.
The most important determinant of outcomes 
is the set of options consumers decide to eval-
uate, known as the consideration set.16–17 Many 
mistakes stem from either considering bad 
financial options or failing to attend to better 
ones.18–20 For example, many home buyers do 
not do any comparison shopping when they 
apply for a mortgage; they simply go with the 
first financial institution they contact, which may 
not necessarily be the best option.21
Meanwhile, the financial options people do eval-
uate will have an array of different attributes that 
must be taken into account—for instance, various 
interest rates, fees, or time horizons. In reaching 
a decision, consumers may weight these factors 
inappropriately. For example, influences such as 
advertising may lead them to attach too much 
significance to relatively unimportant attributes, 
such as past returns on investments, and too 
little importance to more critical features, such 
as fees. Past history, such as directly experi-
encing the adverse effects of a decline in housing 
prices, may also influence the weight given to an 
option’s attributes.6,22–26 In some circumstances, 
people actively avoid information that would help 
them make better decisions.27
Even if consumers have all the information rele-
vant to a choice and correctly weigh all attributes, 
 
Core Findings
What is the issue?
Classical economics 
predicts agents will act 
rationally. However, US 
households often make 
sub-optimal financial 
decisions. Information 
asymmetries, low 
incomes, and bias are 
some of the reasons why 
households struggle 
with financial decisions 
in domains that include 
retirement savings, 
short-term savings, 
debt management, and 
social welfare benefits. 
How can you act?
Selected 
recommendations include:
1) Reminding and 
encouraging IRS tax filers 
with a history of refunds 
to make concrete plans 
about depositing these 
into savings accounts
2) A CFPB-led and tested 
clear recommendation 
system that collects 
basic information from 
prospective mortgage 
borrowers to output 
the best options
Who should take 
the lead? 
Behavioral science 
researchers, policymakers 
across agencies dealing 
with household finances 
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they may nonetheless be unable to appropriately 
evaluate their options. For example, they may 
understand that the interest rate is important 
when deciding whether to save or borrow, but 
because of limited financial literacy, they may be 
unable to accurately assess the implications of 
compounding. This may lead them to extrapo-
late linearly rather than exponentially, resulting in 
their underestimating how much they will gain 
in savings or owe to a lender in the long run.28–31
The combination of limited financial literacy 
and complicated choices can also result in inat-
tention, internal conflict, the application (and 
potential misapplication) of simplifying heuris-
tics, and avoidance.32–36 Inaction in the face of 
complexity is itself another common financial 
mistake.37
Biased Judgments & Preferences
Consumers who have both the knowledge and 
the time to make effective financial decisions 
may still be swayed by imperceptible psycho-
logical biases that favor certain outcomes over 
others. Numerous studies show that individuals 
give more weight to potential losses than to 
equivalently sized potential gains.38–41 They also 
give disproportionate weight to present over 
future outcomes.42,43 Further, they overweight 
very low–probability events relative to higher 
probability ones.44 Consumers’ choices vary with 
how a decision or its attributes are framed and 
the order in which different options or attributes 
are presented and considered.38,45–48 Individ-
uals focus on limited local trade-offs instead of 
broad outcomes, leading to inefficient spending, 
borrowing, and investment outcomes.49,50 Their 
choices are also swayed by their emotional 
state and seemingly irrelevant factors, such as 
whether the weather is good or bad.51,52
Sensitivity to Social Context
Finally, social context may affect consumers’ 
financial decisions. Individuals may look to the 
choices others make for guidance about what 
is best for them, and they may be motivated 
in part by how others perceive their decisions. 
They may evaluate their own outcomes not 
in absolute terms but instead relative to the 
outcomes of others. Employees may inter-
pret the default savings rate for a 401(k) or 
other employer- sponsored retirement plan 
(the fraction of a paycheck to be saved unless 
the employee chooses a different contribution 
rate) as a recommendation from their employer 
about the appropriate savings rate.53 Consumers 
may place too much trust in financial advisors, 
failing to appreciate that certain advisors may 
be motivated in part by self-interest when they 
make recommendations.54–55 Conversely, finan-
cial mistakes can also stem from lack of trust. 
For example, willingness to invest in the stock 
market has been tied to the level of overall 
trust in an economy,56 yet failure to invest in 
the stock market has been widely character-
ized as a mistake because investors forego the 
higher average returns that generally come 
from investing in equities versus, say, bonds or 
certificates of deposit.7 Fear of institutions and 
social stigma may deter people from claiming 
financial benefits to which they are entitled, 
such as welfare, disability, and unemployment 
insurance benefits. If consumers look to finan-
cially capable peers for guidance, they may gain 
valuable information that helps to counter the 
problems that arise from imperfect optimization 
and be encouraged to adopt better financial 
behaviors.57,58 But social comparison can also 
create a sense of envy or discouragement that 
can deter people from engaging in better finan-
cial behaviors.59–61
Interventions to Limit Financial 
Mistakes & Improve Consumers’ 
Financial Outcomes
Improving Retirement Outcomes
Many critical decisions affect financial security 
in retirement. When should an individual retire 
from the workforce? When is it best to claim 
Social Security? How much money should be 
saved for retirement? How should money be 
invested for and dispersed during retirement? Is 
a reverse mortgage or long-term care insurance 
necessary? How should health care coverage 
and other expenditures be managed so that 
“social context may affect 
consumers’ financial decisions”  
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a retiree’s money lasts throughout his or her 
remaining lifetime?
For many individuals, the question of how to save 
for retirement is particularly daunting and subject 
to many of the behavioral barriers described 
above. Several behaviorally informed strategies 
can mitigate these psychological biases and 
have already been successfully implemented at 
scale to increase retirement savings, including 
automatic enrollment, active decisionmaking 
approaches that encourage immediate action, 
and simplified savings plan enrollment options. 
For federal employees and others working for 
eligible organizations, automatic enrollment in 
an employer savings plan such as a 401(k) both 
simplifies the decision about whether to save 
and forestalls procrastination.
There is, nonetheless, room for improvement. In 
2015, an intervention by the White House Social 
and Behavioral Sciences Team (SBST), in collabo-
ration with the Department of Defense, tested an 
active choice approach62 coupled with a “fresh 
start” decision moment to increase savings plan 
participation.63 In this case, the fresh start deci-
sion moment occurred whenever an employee 
changed military bases. At that juncture, 
employees were prompted to make an active 
choice about enrolling in the federal govern-
ment’s Thrift Savings Plan, a retirement savings 
plan for federal workers.64 The federal govern-
ment could build on this initiative by introducing 
other complementary features that encourage 
savings. For example, the Thrift Savings Plan 
enrollment form for military personnel65 offers 
eight different contribution options (for allo-
cations of basic, incentive, special, and bonus 
pay to either pretax or Roth accounts). Many 
individuals might find a predesignated default 
option—for example, “Check here to direct 5% of 
your basic pay to a Roth account invested in a 
target retirement fund”—easier to evaluate than 
this multifaceted choice.66 Other fresh start deci-
sion moments, including the beginning of a new 
calendar year, milestone birthdays,67 pay raises or 
promotions, or even open enrollment for health 
insurance, could be used to direct attention 
to saving for retirement. Imagine a prompt an 
employee might receive on paying off a retire-
ment plan loan: “Check here to increase your 
monthly savings contribution by the amount of 
the loan payment.”
One difficult aspect of the retirement savings 
decision is whether to save on a pretax basis or 
with after-tax contributions to a Roth account.68 
In savings plans where both options are avail-
able, the default is to contribute on a pretax 
basis, although many employees would be 
better served by saving on an after-tax basis. The 
government could test two approaches to opti-
mizing the selection of the option best suited for 
an individual’s situation. One study would pilot 
a differentiated default: Employees for whom 
a Roth account is likely the better option are 
offered that account type as a default, while 
employees for whom a pretax account is likely 
more appropriate are offered the pretax account 
as a default. Another approach would provide 
employees with checklists that enumerate the 
reasons one might prefer to save on a pretax 
basis and the reasons one might prefer to save 
on an after-tax basis;69 this could mitigate the 
effects of biased judgment and some of the 
other psychological tendencies discussed above.
Financial security in retirement is also affected 
by when individuals decide to start receiving 
Social Security. Individuals can claim bene-
fits as soon as they turn 62, but waiting to take 
benefits can substantially increase the monthly 
benefit received.70 Whether it is best to start 
receiving benefits at age 62 or to delay depends 
on a variety of individual factors, such as how 
long one expects to live. This is another instance 
where a preference checklist could help.69 The 
SSA could pilot such an approach with older 
federal employees as part of the annual benefits 
statement sent to workers, on its website, or as 
part of the Social Security application process. 
The DOL could facilitate tests of the same 
strategy with private-sector employers.
Individuals must also decide how to transform 
their accumulated savings into resources for 
consumption once they reach retirement. One 
way is to purchase an annuity, a financial instru-
ment that, in its simplest form, guarantees a 
regular monthly income to an individual for life 
or a set term. Social Security is essentially an 
annuity provided by the federal government, 
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but individuals can purchase an annuity from 
an insurance company to provide an addi-
tional source of secure income. These annuities 
come in many different forms and with a variety 
of features that can be difficult to evaluate 
and compare. For example, does the annuity 
payment increase over time with inflation and, 
if so, by how much? Does the annuity provide 
a survivor benefit and, if so, how large is that 
benefit and how long does it last? Whether to 
buy an annuity and what features to choose are 
perhaps the most complicated financial deci-
sions that most households will make.
In its role as an employer, the federal government 
is in a position to pilot different approaches to 
help employees make decisions about whether 
and how to transform their savings into retire-
ment annuities. Successful approaches could 
then be used as models for other employers 
more broadly. Interventions that might be 
appropriate include providing employees who 
are nearing retirement with preference check-
lists that summarize the reasons for and against 
purchasing an annuity, as well as incorporating 
in their quarterly statements information on 
how much monthly retirement income their 
savings will generate.71–73 It may also make sense 
to frame the decision in ways that highlight the 
potential value of having annuity income to 
supplement Social Security. The government 
could, for instance, emphasize the value of an 
annuity in ensuring that individuals do not outlive 
their financial resources while de-emphasizing 
how long an individual would need to live to get 
a positive return.45,74–77
Saving for Short-Term Needs
Individuals have many reasons to save other 
than for retirement. They face known expenses 
for which they can plan, like the down payment 
for a house or college tuition for their children. 
They also face unknown expenses, like unan-
ticipated car repairs or medical bills. Individuals 
struggle with both types of savings. For example, 
despite placing a high value on a college educa-
tion, fewer than half of families are saving for 
this known expense for their children.78 Similarly, 
less than half of households report being able 
to cover an unexpected $400 expense without 
borrowing or selling possessions.79 Many touch 
points can be leveraged to facilitate short-
term savings. We focus on two areas where 
the government might have the most success: 
influencing the investment of tax-time savings 
and utilizing the federal government’s role as 
an employer.
Tax time is a particularly potent touch point: It 
presents a unique opportunity for asset building, 
because many households receive large refunds, 
sometimes accounting for as much as 30% of 
their annual income.80 Interventions that facilitate 
or encourage saving a portion of an individu-
al’s refund at the time of tax filing do increase 
savings.81,82 But such interventions may be more 
effective if they include communications well 
in advance of tax season, because consumers 
often mentally allocate their anticipated refunds 
prior to filing.83,84 One strategy would be for 
the IRS to remind tax filers who have received a 
refund in the past that they can directly deposit 
a portion of their refund into a savings account 
and then encourage them to make a concrete 
plan around how much of their future refund 
they would like to save. To increase the salience 
of tax time as a saving opportunity, the govern-
ment could also frame tax time as a fresh start 
moment and include a preference checklist to 
reinforce the reasons to save.63,69,85
As the nation’s largest employer, the federal 
government is well positioned to help its 
employees improve their financial health 
and serve as a model for other employers. 
For example, when employees are hired, the 
government could facilitate opening a savings 
account for emergencies for new employees 
who do not already have one. Also, the Trea-
sury Department could redesign the federal 
government’s direct deposit sign-up form to 
facilitate and promote depositing a portion of 
each paycheck directly into a savings account.86 
Different approaches that may help include 
framing direct deposit into both a checking 
account and a savings account as the option 
best suited for most employees—thus encour-
aging an active choice about how much of each 
paycheck to direct into a savings account versus 
a checking account—and providing a preference 
checklist that highlights the reasons to save a 
part of each paycheck.37,62,69
$14.5t 
value of US household 
liabilities in 2016
10%
guaranteed savings rate of 
return offered to deployed 
military members
$450b
cost of tax evasion 
in the form of 
underreported income
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Other pivotal life moments include the birth or 
adoption of a child, promotions, job separation, 
and deployments for military service personnel; 
at all these junctures, the federal government 
can facilitate savings by its employees. For 
example, when employees add a newborn to 
their employee health insurance, the govern-
ment could provide information about 529 
college savings plans along with a simplified way 
of making automatic contributions to such a 
plan each pay period. As another example, many 
government employees receive large payouts 
for accumulated vacation time at job separation. 
The government could enable an employee to 
direct a portion of this payout to the employee’s 
savings account through direct deposit.
Finally, members of the military have a unique 
opportunity to participate in a savings program 
that guarantees a 10% rate of return while they 
are deployed. Currently, service members 
are able to sign up for this program only after 
deployment. The Department of Defense could 
design and test a protocol to allow eligible mili-
tary personnel to sign up before deployment and 
to highlight the benefits of doing so.
Managing Personal Debt
Individuals face difficult and costly decisions 
when it comes to debt: whether to borrow, how 
to borrow, how much to borrow, when and how 
to repay, and which debts to prioritize when 
repayment funds are limited.87 Debts can be cate-
gorized by how fast each one has to be repaid: 
credit cards and payday loans, for instance, are 
considered short-term debt, whereas mortgages 
and student loans are considered long-term 
obligations. Each type of debt creates its own 
set of challenges for borrowers. Because many 
consumers make decisions about short-term 
debt with some regularity, they can potentially 
learn from their initial mistakes. In contrast, deci-
sions to take on long-term debt are generally 
made infrequently and often involve sizeable 
financial sums. As a result, the potential to learn 
across these borrowing instances is limited, 
and the financial repercussions of mistakes are 
potentially large.
We propose a set of behaviorally informed 
approaches to improve outcomes around both 
short- and long-term debts, focusing specif-
ically on some of the major sources of debt 
that have received a lot of public scrutiny as of 
late—credit cards, payday loans, mortgages, 
and student loans—although many of the same 
approaches could be applied to a wide range of 
debt products.
Credit Cards. Several obstacles stand in the way 
of effectively managing credit card debt. One 
is the difficulty of figuring out the true cost of 
credit in the face of the many different types of 
fees (annual fees, over-limit fees, late fees, and 
cash advance fees) and interest rates (teaser, 
regular, and penalty rates), in addition to incen-
tives from the array of cash-back or rewards 
programs associated with card use. Other 
barriers include a poor understanding of the 
effects of compound interest and a culture that 
promotes spending rather than saving. Interven-
tions that could facilitate better decisionmaking 
include visualization tools to help consumers see 
the effects of compound interest and calcula-
tors that clarify the total cost of purchases under 
different repayment scenarios. Borrowers would 
also likely benefit from real-time notifications 
about just-incurred charges and upcoming and 
ongoing fees, which would increase the salience 
of these costs and help consumers avoid them 
in the future.22,30 The CFPB and federal govern-
ment employee credit unions could test such 
approaches among federal employees and 
consumers at large.
Payday Loans. Another problematic source of 
consumer credit is payday loans, which involve 
relatively small amounts of money targeted 
for repayment on the borrower’s next payday. 
Consumers often fail to anticipate that they may 
be unable to repay their loan when it is due. In 
that case, they roll over the loan until the next 
payday, but they must pay an additional fee to do 
so. These fees can snowball if the loan is rolled 
“Individuals face difficult and 
costly decisions when it 
comes to debt” 
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over repeatedly and, in some cases, can even 
exceed the initial amount of money borrowed. 
Approaches that could be tested to reduce such 
repeated rollovers include disclosures at the time 
of loan origination that highlight the high like-
lihood of having a future rollover, a worksheet 
to help consumers make a concrete plan about 
timely loan repayment, and a policy of encour-
aging at least partial repayment if full repayment 
cannot be made.85,88 A different approach would 
be to guide consumers to alternative products 
with lower costs. Banks and credit unions already 
have substantial information about consumers 
and are thus well placed to offer competitive 
products at a lower cost, and some already do. 
The DOL could also encourage the nascent 
market for employer-based payday advances 
to help establish a less onerous alternative to 
payday loans.
Mortgages. Like credit cards, mortgages differ 
along many dimensions. Some have an interest 
rate that is fixed for the life of the mortgage, 
whereas others have an adjustable rate that 
changes over time with market conditions. 
Although 15- and 30-year mortgages are the 
most common, the duration of residential mort-
gages can vary from 5 to 40 years. Some allow 
borrowers to pay an up-front cost, or points, in 
exchange for a lower interest rate. And all mort-
gages come with a variety of different costs that 
are paid at closing. These different features can 
make finding the best mortgage difficult. To 
reduce the barriers to comparison shopping and 
appropriate mortgage selection, the CFPB could 
develop and test a simple and clear recom-
mendation system that would collect basic 
information from borrowers and then present 
them with a small number of options best 
suited to their needs. The output could include 
a “people like you” estimate of the likelihood of 
defaulting on a proposed loan. The recommen-
dation system could also include a feature to 
help consumers assess when refinancing would 
actually be worth the cost.89,90 HUD, along 
with bank regulators, could then test various 
approaches to making this system broadly avail-
able and widely used by home buyers.
Student Loans. Although loans for college 
can be a good investment, many students fail 
to distinguish between what they can borrow 
and what they should borrow. They are poorly 
attuned to the expected salary associated with 
degrees from different schools and different 
majors. In many cases, they borrow money to 
go to school, fail to complete a degree, and are 
then saddled with debt but without the benefits 
of the higher pay that comes with graduation. 
There is tremendous potential for interventions 
that can help students understand the finan-
cial benefits they are likely to receive from their 
college experience and determine a manageable 
level of debt.
The DOE could expand its College Scorecard 
website91–93 to incorporate information about 
the job and salary outcomes for nongraduates 
and graduates, stratified by college major.94 The 
CFPB and the DOE could develop and test the 
effectiveness of dynamic budgeting exercises, 
like the Iowa Student Loan Game Plan, that allow 
students to estimate college costs, monthly 
living expenses, student loan payments, and 
postgraduation salaries to help them evaluate 
how much they can afford to borrow.95 The DOE 
could also test different types of choice architec-
ture—ways of structuring a decision process and 
presenting choice options—to determine which 
approaches work best for helping students 
decide how much to borrow and which repay-
ment plan is most appropriate for their situation. 
The presentation of repayment options might 
be tailored to particular colleges and majors and 
incorporate dynamic budgeting systems to help 
students assess whether their expected monthly 
income after graduation will be able to cover the 
required repayments.
Improving Take-Up of Benefits 
for Low-Income Households
The government offers important financial 
assistance to low-income households. Yet each 
year, millions of eligible households fail to claim 
“millions of eligible 
households fail to claim what 
can be substantial benefits”  
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what can be substantial benefits from programs 
such as the earned income tax credit (EITC), 
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP), Temporary Assistance for Needy Fami-
lies (TANF), and the Supplemental Security 
Income program (SSI).96,97 Economists have 
traditionally attributed this failure to the time 
and effort associated with program application 
or the social stigma of participation.98 Recent 
evidence, however, suggests that low take-up, 
particularly among the very poor, may also be 
due to psychological frictions, such as a lack of 
program awareness, confusion about benefits 
and eligibility, and administrative complexity.99–101
One strategy to overcome these behavioral 
barriers is for agencies to market eligibility and 
enrollment instructions through simple and 
repeated communications aimed at those who 
are potentially eligible for given programs. Some 
agencies have found, for instance, that repeti-
tion of messaging, prominent declarations of 
likely eligibility and benefits, and clear enroll-
ment instructions have increased participation. 
Using such methods, the IRS has increased EITC 
claiming by eligible individuals.99
A second strategy is to leverage existing program 
touch points, cross-promoting other programs 
for which individuals might be eligible. For 
example, the IRS could promote and provide 
information about student loan eligibility when 
individuals with appropriately aged children file 
their taxes.100 The Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services could communicate likely 
eligibility for the EITC and other social welfare 
programs to low-income individuals enrolling 
for health insurance through the HealthCare.gov 
marketplace. Such cross-promotion could be 
especially beneficial for targeting EITC nonclaim-
ants who might otherwise not file a tax return. 
Finally, given the potential limits to even the 
most adeptly designed marketing and education 
schemes, the federal government could bypass 
administrative hassles altogether and automati-
cally enroll individuals when both appropriate 
and feasible. For example, rather than mailing 
notices to eligible tax filers about unclaimed 
EITC benefits, the IRS could instead simply mail 
nonclaimants a benefit check.
Improving Tax Outcomes for 
Individuals & Government
Decisions about income taxes, such as how 
much of one’s pay to withhold throughout the 
year, affect both household finances and the 
federal government’s budget. Some people view 
overwithholding of taxes as a useful commitment 
device to ensure that they save. Others prefer 
to get a smaller refund and have more income 
available throughout the year. Still others owe 
substantial additional taxes at year-end because 
they have too little withheld from their pay.
Unfortunately, the relationship between the 
allowances claimed on IRS Form W-4 (which 
determines the rate at which employers with-
hold taxes) and the amount of money likely to 
be owed or refunded in April is not at all trans-
parent to most taxpayers (including the authors 
of this article).102 The IRS would provide a great 
service if it redesigned the W-4 to help taxpayers 
better match their withholding with their ulti-
mate tax liability. The W-4 could also highlight 
and encourage usage of the online withholding 
calculator hosted on the IRS website.103 Further, 
the IRS could communicate with taxpayers who 
either have very large refunds due or owe addi-
tional taxes to help them calculate a withholding 
rate better aligned with their actual tax liability for 
the upcoming tax year.
Having too little tax withheld from each paycheck 
and owing additional tax when returns are due 
can encourage tax evasion by spurring people 
to underreport income, be more aggressive 
in claiming deductions, or not file at all.104 Tax 
evasion in the form of underreported income 
costs the federal government over $450 billion 
annually and puts evaders at risk for prosecu-
tion. Proposed remedies for this tax gap, such 
as devoting additional resources to enforce-
ment, are typically expensive.105 However, small 
changes to tax forms, informed by behavioral 
science, may increase compliance at little added 
cost. For example, tax returns currently require 
taxpayers to attest that the information provided 
in the return is true and accurate at the end of 
the form, after they have already decided what 
income to report and what deductions to claim. 
Experimental research suggests that signing at 
the beginning of a form rather than at the end 
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of it can make moral standards salient, reducing 
subsequent lying.64,106 Tax returns could easily 
be modified to incorporate this insight, and 
the IRS should consider testing this approach. 
Income underreporting can also be addressed 
by asking more direct questions. Taxpayers can 
currently hide income that is not reported on a 
W-2 or 1099 by not adding that amount to their 
documented income, thereby lying by omission. 
Tax returns could instead directly ask whether 
taxpayers earned income that was not reported 
on a W-2 or 1099 and require an explicit yes 
or no response. Lying by commission (falsely 
stating that no unreported income was earned) 
would likely be more distressing (and thus less 
probable) than lying by omission.107,108
Farther-Reaching Actions
The interventions described above could be 
implemented by the appropriate agencies in 
relatively short order under existing laws and 
regulations. A number of additional behavior-
ally informed policies could improve financial 
outcomes for households but would require 
legislative changes or a longer time frame. For 
instance, retirement savings could be facili-
tated through legislation mandating automatic 
employee enrollment in a retirement savings 
plan, as has recently been instituted in the United 
Kingdom. Legislation at either the federal or the 
state level is also needed to allow firms to auto-
matically enroll employees into a nonretirement 
savings account or to permit savings accounts 
to come with prizes, another approach used to 
facilitate short-term, nonretirement savings in 
other countries.109,110 Requiring that part or all of 
a tax refund go to savings could help households 
better budget for anticipated future expenses, 
such as a summer vacation or back-to-school 
clothes for kids, or to meet unexpected 
expenses, such as a car repair, without resorting 
to costly forms of credit. Enabling a market for 
experts who help students file for financial aid, 
much as firms help individuals prepare their 
taxes, might increase the likelihood of college 
attendance and completion.100 Alternatively, 
simplifying the tax code and the financial aid 
application process would help individuals make 
fewer financial mistakes when filing their taxes or 
seeking funding for college.
One long-term strategy involves creating a 
universal portal through which claimants can 
both verify eligibility for and complete enroll-
ment in a range of programs. A consolidated 
portal might resemble the existing Benefits.gov 
site but with expanded functionality and a back 
end supported by the integration of adminis-
trative databases currently housed in different 
agencies. Another solution would be to simplify, 
standardize, and consolidate benefit programs. 
For example, having uniform definitions for 
the terms used in the screening criteria across 
programs—such as what the term depen-
dent means—would be a sensible step toward 
reducing confusion over eligibility and increasing 
participation without significantly expanding the 
number of people who could qualify. Similarly, 
consolidating and simplifying the child tax credit, 
the EITC, and dependent exemptions could 
reduce the tax-filing burden while also facili-
tating accurate claiming of tax benefits.
Conclusion
Individuals make financial decisions almost every 
day of their lives. Invariably, some of those deci-
sions are better than others. While many are of 
little consequence, such as how much to tip a 
restaurant server, others can have significant 
long-term implications, such as how much to 
save for retirement or whether to get a fixed-
rate or an adjustable-rate mortgage. Many poor 
financial decisions are the result of systematic 
psychological tendencies: failure to comparison 
shop for financial products, like a mortgage; 
overweighting the importance of salient char-
acteristics, like past returns, when choosing an 
investment while underweighting less salient 
but potentially more relevant information, like 
fees; and avoiding things that are difficult, such 
as applying for college financial aid. In its dual 
roles as regulator and employer, the government 
could feasibly test and implement many behav-
iorally informed policies to improve household 
financial outcomes in a variety of domains. In 
this article, we outlined several such policies that 
could enhance financial security in retirement, 
facilitate short-term savings, help households 
better manage consumer debt, increase take-up 
of government benefits for which individuals 
are eligible, and improve tax outcomes for 
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individuals and the government. Some of our 
proposed interventions are low-cost and rela-
tively straightforward and could be implemented 
under existing laws and regulations. Others 
would require legislative changes, a longer time 
frame for design and implementation, or both. 
Politicians and government regulators can help 
improve the financial situations of individuals 
and households by recognizing how financial 
decisions are actually made and pursuing behav-
iorally informed policies such as these.
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